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describe  an efﬁcient  exact  method  to  calculate  the  expected  outbreak  size  of a contagion  on  an  outbreak-
invariant  network  that  is  a directed  and  acyclic,  allowing  us to model  all  dynamically  changing  networks
when  contagion  can only  travel  forward  in time.  We  describe  our  algorithm  and  its use in  pseudocode,
as  well  as showing  examples  of  its  use on  disease  relevant,  data-derived  networks.
©  2016  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  B.V. This  is  an open  access  article  under  the  CC BY  licenseontagion on networks
. Introduction
Increasingly, models of contagion spread on highly structured
opulations are being used to inform disease control (Green et al.,
008; James et al., 2007; Eames et al., 2015; Danon et al., 2011).
s these models become increasingly complex, simple and robust
pproaches to calculate the potential outbreak size become increas-
ngly important. Here, we provide an algorithm which allows this
o be done faster than current methods on a variety of real-world
etworks.
Previous research (Eames et al., 2015; Danon et al., 2011) uses
imulation to estimate expected outbreak size on various different
ypes of network. This is computationally intensive, and provides
nly stochastically derived estimates for the outbreak size. We
resent an exact method for calculating expected outbreak size.
hile our method does not apply to arbitrary contagion spread
n general networks, which is a known NP-hard problem (Shapiro
nd Delgado-Eckert, 2012), it is relevant to the wide range of con-
agion examples that can be expressed on the well-studied class
f directed acyclic graphs (DAGs): networks in which there are no
irected cycles. This class is particularly useful for modelling tem-
orally changing contact networks, and the notion that time (and
herefore infection) only ﬂows in one direction is central to our
pproach.
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: jenright@gmail.com (J. Enright).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.epidem.2016.05.002
755-4365/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article u(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Our method has two  advantages over simulation: it is compu-
tationally much faster, and it gives an exact answer rather than a
statistical estimate. These two advantages are of particular impor-
tance in applications where a rapid estimate is important, without
the requirement for a detailed behavioural or disease model, as in
an outbreak situation with stringent externally-imposed timelines,
or as an internal component in a larger software package that must
complete a very large number of outbreak size calculations over a
large number of different networks.
The method we  describe here has much in common with several
previously described methods: the novelty is largely in our algo-
rithmic treatment and its use on a particular multi-layer directed
acyclic graph (a structure also used in Kim and Anderson, 2012;
Valdano et al., 2015) in order to incorporate a temporally chang-
ing network. We  wish to highlight the relatedness of our approach
to the methods of Rogers(Rogers, 2015), and Ludwig’s method
(Ludwig, 1975) as applied to a random network by House et al.
(2012).
Rogers (2015) and Karrer and Newman (2010) describe the use
of a cavity method on a network to calculate node risk and travel the
development of an outbreak, as well as its ﬁnal size. Rogers (2015)
uses a tree approximation of a static network in its calculations of
probability of given node’s involvement in an outbreak; we  apply
a similar calculation to our directed acyclic graph.
Ludwig’s method works on a system of pre-generated ranks in
which nodes are assigned an order, and considered for infection in
that order, and when applied to a network, requires the network
be unchanged by an outbreak (Ludwig, 1975; House et al., 2012;
Pellis et al., 2008). Given a starting node for the outbreak, nodes are
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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orted by the length of their shortest paths to the starting node, with
hese shortest path lengths used as each node’s “rank”. Nodes are
onsidered for infection by order of their ranks, with nodes closer
o the starting node considered earlier. As described in House et al.
2012), an implementation of Sellke’s construction (Sellke, 2012)
n a network bears a close resemblance to Ludwig’s method on a
etwork.
As with Ludwig’s method, we will consider nodes in a rough
rder of distance from an outbreak seeding set of nodes, though for
ur approach any topological ordering would sufﬁce, and (again like
n Ludwig’s method) we will require our network to be invariant
ith respect to the outbreak.
We direct the reader to House et al. (2012) for a review of a
ide variety of methods in use for calculating the probability mass
unction of a ﬁnal outbreak size.
We present the method on a DAG derived from an infection net-
ork in Section 3. In Section 4 we show the method on several
xample networks, including two derived from real-world data.
ection 5 compares our method to a series of simulations, demon-
trating the advantages in speed and accuracy. We  conclude with
ome adaptations which can be made to run the algorithm on more
omplex contagion networks, and some suggestions for further
esearch. We  provide open-source Python code which we  hope will
e of use in the future to other researchers.1
. Overview of algorithm on a directed acyclic graph
We  describe our approach in several steps: ﬁrst, following Kim
nd Anderson (2012) we describe the production of a directed
cyclic graph to describe a dynamically changing network. While
e will focus on calculating on a dynamic network, it is possible to
roduce the directed acyclic graph required from a static network
imply by repeating static contacts over many time steps.
Using this DAG as input, we then describe an efﬁcient algorithm
o calculate the expectation that any given node will be infected at a
iven time in an epidemic where individuals become immediately
nfectious and remain infections indeﬁnitely (an SI model), or can
ecover and become immediately susceptible again (SIS). We allow
n arbitrary choice, or distribution of choices, of starting nodes and
imes for the epidemic. Because expectations can be combined lin-
arly (Hamming, 1991), this node-by-node expectation calculation
nables us to calculate the expected size of an overall outbreak
xactly at any ﬁxed timepoint, again, either with a set starting node
nd time, or over a speciﬁed distribution of starting points.
.1. Producing a directed acyclic graph from a dynamic network
In our preferred method for producing a DAG from a dynamic
etwork, we essentially identify each agent at each time step with
 node in the DAG, with an edge from one node (u, t) in the DAG to
nother (v, t + 1) if the state of the vertex u at time t can affect the
tate of the vertex v at time t + 1. As in Kim and Anderson (2012)
nd Valdano et al. (2015) we use a multi-layered directed acyclic
raph in which each layer is a time slice to encode a dynamically
hanging network of impulse edges. We  assume throughout that
isease cannot spread instantaneously, that is, an agent infected at
 cannot infect another instantaneously, but is only able to infect
thers at t + , where  is an appropriately and arbitrarily small
umber. We  also assume that the set of contacts that make up the
etwork are known before the beginning of our calculation.
Let G = (V, E) be a graph (or network) with vertices V and time-
mpulse directed edges E.  Let T be the relation between impulses
1 https://github.com/magicicada/expected-outbreak-size.ics 16 (2016) 56–62 57
and the times at which they occur. We  assume that the range of
T is a subset of the integers. Let E be the set of edges expressed
as triples: (u, v, t) indicating an edge from u to v at time t, and let
Q : E → [0...1]  be the probability that, if the source of each impulse
contact is infected, it will infect the destination of the edges.
Let VT be the set: {(v, t) where v ∈ V , and t ∈ [min(range(T)) −
1... max(range(T))]} Let ET be the set:
• {((v, t) → (u, s)) where u = v and s = t+ 1} ∪
• {((v, t) → (u, s)) where t = T(u, v) and s = t + 1}
Let P : ET → [0...1]  be a function from ET to real-numbered
probabilities between 0 and 1 such that:
• for edge ((u, t) → (u, t + 1)), we set P(((v, t) → (u, t + 1))) to the
probability that the disease persists at v from time t to t + 1 and
• for edge ((v, t) → (u, t + 1)) where (v, u, t) ∈ T,  we set P(((v, t) →
(u, s))) = Q (v, u, t)
We have the building blocks of our directed acyclic graph in the
form of a node set, an edge set, and probabilistic weights for the
edges. Let graph GT = (VT , ET ) be a directed graph: we know that
GT is acyclic because for every edge ((v, t) → (u, s)) ∈ ET we know
that s > t; intuitively, the edges only go forward in time.
With the directed acyclic graph GT = (VT , ET ) and the probability
weighting function P we have the required input for our algorithm.
Therefore, given a set of integer-time impulse contacts with prob-
abilities of disease transmission associated with each contact, we
can produce the graph we  need, and use our algorithm to calculate
expected outbreak size.
3. Expected outbreak size algorithm
While our algorithm below will work on any directed acyclic
graph, we  describe it in the context of a time-expanded graph as
above, as this is the most relevant to our examples.
Let G = (V, E) be a directed, acyclic graph as described above
and P : E → [0...1]  be a function from the edges of G to probabil-
ities such that P((u → v)) is the probability that u will infect v  if
it is, itself, infected. Note that, as described, there may  be edges
((u, t) → (v, t + 1)) where u /= v between different agents at suc-
cessive times, as well as edges ((u, t) → (u, t + 1)) between the same
agent at successive times. The probability that an edge of the type
((u, t) → (u, t + 1)) transmits is the probability that an infection of
agent u at time t persists to time t + 1. In general, the probabilities
that edges transmit infection may differ: this is no impediment, so
long as it is recorded in P.
We start with a question: what is the expectation that (v, t)
is infected in an epidemic with a known starting point (u, t0)? If
we consider all nodes at all times that could be infected in an epi-
demic stating at (u, t0), we  can identify the set of nodes that could
directly infect (v, t): those that are the source of an edge leading
into (v, t) that could, themselves, potentially be infected by an epi-
demic starting at (u, t0). We  call these the parents of (v, t), and due
to the construction of the DAG we  have used, we know that they
are in time slice t − 1. Let A = {(p0, t − 1), (p1, t − 1) . . . (pm, t − 1)} be
the set of parents of (v, t) in a traversal of G from (u, t0). Note that, if
we are using a time-expanded graph as deﬁned above, then exactly
one pi will be equal to u: exactly one parent of an agent at a time
is that agent at the previous time. Then the probability that (v, t)
is infected in an outbreak is the probability that at least one par-
ent is infected and infects (v, t). Recall that P(((pi, t − 1) → (v, t)))
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s the probability that, if (pi, t − 1) is infected, it infects (v, t). Then
f PI((v, t)) is the probability that (v, t) is infected,
I((v, t)) = 1 − [
m∏
i=0
(1 − PI((pi, t − 1))]
To calculate this probability for (v, t) we need only know the
robabilities that each of (v, t)’s parents are infected, and the prob-
bility of transmission along the inward edges from those parents:
ecause the graph is directed and acyclic we can generate in linear
ime an ordering of the nodes in V such that every vertex occurs
fter all of its parents: for example, a topological ordering. Given
his ordering we need only calculate the above probability for each
ode in turn. Then, for any given time, we can calculate the expected
umber of infected nodes that represent agents at that time: in this
ay we can produce an epidemic curve over time. We  present this
lgorithm as pseudocode in Algorithm 1.
Note that a node that is not reachable from the initially infected
et of nodes will have zero expectation of infection, and if every
dge had a 100% probability of transmitting disease then every
ode reachable from the initially infected nodes would certainly
ventually be infected. This is not usually the case, and so the set of
odes reachable from the initially infected nodes (such as might be
omputed using Dijkstra’s algorithm), gives us an upper bound on
he expected outbreak size calculated by the algorithm described
ere. Computing a topological (or pre-order) sort of the vertices in
he directed acyclic graph takes time that is in the worst case linear
n the size of that graph: in practice, we need only compute it for
he vertices accessible from vertices in the outbreak seeding set, a
igniﬁcant time savings for many seeding sets, and do so using a
imple breadth-ﬁrst search. In fact, this computation can be done
t the same time as the expectation values computation, and in
ractice therefore happens for free. If pre-computed, it takes time
imilar to the expectation computation traversal – on our testing
achine about 0.08 ms  for a network of 2699 nodes.
lgorithm 1. Algorithm to calculate the probability that each
ode in a time-expanded graph is infected in an epidemic at a given
tart node.
nput:  A time-expanded graph G = (V, E), a node nstart where the epidemic
will  be seeded, P a mapping of edges in G to probabilities that those edges
will transmit infection if source of edge is infected
utput:  A mapping from nodes in the time-expanded graph to probabilities
that each is infected in an epidemic seeded at nstart
← the DAG of all nodes of G reachable from nstart
← a topological ordering of nodes in T
 ← an empty mapping
or (u, t) ∈ O do
P← parents of (u, t) in T
probNotInfected ← 1
for (v, t′) ∈ P do
probInfectThis ← P[((v, t′) → (u, t)]
probNotInfected ← probNotInfected · (1- probInfectThis · D[(v, t′)])
end for
D[(u, t)] ← 1- probNotInfected
nd for
eturn D
While we have described the intuition of our algorithm as for
n epidemic with a single outbreak seed node in the network, it is
qually applicable for an arbitrarily sized set of seeding nodes, and
ven an arbitrary probability of being seed node over any possible
et of seed nodes – the calculation can be done in one traversal, and
eed not be repeated for each seed in the set. This will be especially
aluable when an initial set of infected nodes is known, as is often
he case in an outbreak that is discovered in progress.ics 16 (2016) 56–62
4. Expected outbreak size calculation examples
To demonstrate the output and performance of the expectation
calculation method we use a Python implementation to calculate
the expected outbreak size of a SIS epidemic on two  data-derived
networks and a randomly-generated scale-free network and show
the results in Fig. 1. In all our calculations we use a transmission
probability of 0.4 for each contact, and a recovery probability of 0.2
at each time step. These values are not intended to represent any
particular contagion, but rather are used as demonstration values.
The units of our outbreak sizes are agent-timesteps, as we calculate
the expectation that each agent is infected at each timestep, and
then sum over all timesteps to ﬁnd the overall expected agent-
timestep epidemic size.
Our two data-derived networks are the network of cattle trades
within Scotland in 2011 and message contacts on a Facebook-
like social network for students at the University of California,
Irvine (Opsahl and Panzarasa, 2009). Both datasets have tempo-
rally explicit directed impulse contacts. In these two data-derived
networks, we use 10-day periods covering the entire network time
period. We  generated a random scale-free network using tools pro-
vided in the python networkx library, and assigned each edge three
times chosen uniformly at random between time step 0 and 10, to
be consistent with the ten-day time periods considered in the data-
derived networks. The edge frequencies here are chosen solely for
demonstration purposes, and result in a network with similar daily
density to the cattle movement dataset. All calculations of expected
epidemic sizes used over all the networks executed in a total of less
than ﬁve minutes.
As is typical in real-world networks, many outbreaks are very
small, and are not expected to leave their initial incursion point.
4.1. Cattle trading links in Scotland
While the majority of cattle movements between holdings in
Great Britain are recorded, it has been possible in recent years
for holdings to apply for linkages to other holdings that allow the
owner of animals on that ﬁrst holding to move those animals to
and from the second holding without reporting. These linkages are
a source of uncertainty in the cattle movement network in Scotland,
as the magnitude and frequency of their use is unknown.
As a means of estimating these linkages potential impact on the
size of an outbreak in Scotland, we  used our rapid expected out-
break size calculation method to calculate the increase in expected
outbreak size resulting from a simpliﬁed inclusion of these links,
and to qualitatively examine the geographic distribution of hold-
ings likely to be infected in a randomly seeded epidemic, comparing
the situation with and without the inclusion of these links. The high
level of uncertainty makes our technique especially appropriate:
because we  do not know the appropriate infection probabilities or
relative risk of a contact, we  must explore a very large parameter
space, giving expected outbreak sizes at a large variety of disease
and contact parameters. Such a large variety of parameters would
require a computationally demanding number of simulation runs.
The speed of our approach allowed us to produce a timely result.
In addition, the expected outbreak size calculation gives farm-by-
farm expectation of infection, allowing us to map  the possible
impact of these linkages at a farm level.
As we would expect, including linkages as movements increases
expected outbreak size with higher probabilities of transmission
and more frequent use of linkages increasing the expected out-
break size more (Fig. 2). Because of the uncertainly about the use
of trade linkages, the results in Fig. 2 are shown over a variety of
transmission settings and linkage uses, which, if computed by sim-
ulation, would have required a large number of simulations at a
J. Enright, R.R. Kao / Epidemics 16 (2016) 56–62 59
Fig. 1. Frequencies of expected outbreak sizes in agent time-steps started uniformly at random over all starting locations at the beginning of a 10 time-step period on three
networks: on the left, a Scottish cattle trading network in 2011, in the middle a human electronic message contact network, and on the right a random scale-free network.
We  do not plot the sizes of outbreaks that are not expected to spread beyond their initial starting point.
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sig. 2. The expected number of holdings infected in an outbreak of a disease spre
ransmitted by a batch movement of animals. We report expected outbreak sizes w
imes  per month. This calculation used animal movements from each month in 201
umber of simulation settings, presenting a signiﬁcant barrier to
roducing this result in a timely manner.
In addition to calculating the impact of linkages on the overall
xpected size of an outbreak, we also characterised the individual
arms by their expectation of infection, which allows us to see, in
ig. 3, that the general geographic areas of most-likely infection
emain the same with and without the linkages; a useful insight
or geographic targeting of disease surveillance.
ig. 3. Cattle holdings in Scotland, coloured by their probability of being infected in an ou
ost  likely and green being least likely. Holdings that are only expected to be infected b
pread over linkages, on the right linkages are included in disease spread. among cattle holdings in Scotland over a variety of probabilities of disease being
t registered linkages, and when each linkage is included once, three times, and ﬁve
5. Simulation use compared to expected outbreak size
calculation
Running both our algorithm and 100 strings of a standard
forward micro-simulation approach, we  calculated the expected
outbreak size of a simulated SI contagion on the Scottish cattle
movement network in January 2011 (with transmission probabil-
ity of 0.4 with each contact, and the epidemic starting on the 1st of
tbreak seeded uniformly at random at a cattle holding in Scotland, with red being
y outbreaks seeded at that holding itself are omitted. On the left, outbreaks do not
60 J. Enright, R.R. Kao / Epidemics 16 (2016) 56–62
Fig. 4. The estimated outbreak size in agent-timesteps over the course of many
strings of simulations on the Scottish cattle movement network in January 2011.
Each serial string of simulations is one red line: values converge over a large number
of  simulations towards the expected outbreak size (shown in blue) as calculated
using the method presented in this work. (For interpretation of the references to
colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 5. The standard deviation of the simulation-generate estimate that a set of
nodes will be infected as a percentage of the true expectation of that value over the
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Fig. 6. Frequencies of computation times for a single run of the topological sort
required for our expectation calculation, our exact expectation calculation, simula-
tion using the Sellke construction, and simple forward simulation. All simulations
were run on a late 2013 iMac with a 3.2 GHz Intel Core i5 processor, and were run
on  the Scottish cattle movement network in January 2011, with outbreaks seeded
this effect when the contagion is simple and the contact networkourse of many strings of simulations on the Scottish cattle movement network in
anuary 2011 for all nodes, ﬁfty randomly chosen nodes, and the ﬁfty nodes with
he highest number of contacts over the entire month.
anuary, located uniformly at random across all cattle holdings in
he network). Each simulation string consists of a series of indepen-
ent micro-simulations, with the estimate of expected outbreak
ize after some set of simulations calculated as the mean of the
utbreak sizes in the simulations to that point. The results are pre-
ented in Fig. 4, where the blue line represents the output of our
lgorithm, which is the exact expectation of the size of the outbreak
n the network. We  see that the simulation method can take many
terations to converge to anything close to the exact answer – and
ven then there is some error.
In the course of our calculation, we ﬁnd the expectation that any
iven node will be infected in an outbreak started across a uniform
istribution of starting points for the epidemic. As for the overall
xpected outbreak size, the simulated value converges over a large
umber of simulations towards the expected value. The rate of
his convergence is not uniform over all sets of nodes; in Fig. 5 we
how this convergence as the standard deviation of the simulated
alues as a percentage of the true expected value for all nodes, ﬁftyat each possible holding on January 1st. The mean computation time for the topo-
logical sort was 0.08 ms,  for the expectation calculation was 0.08 ms,  for the Sellke
construction was  0.05 ms, and for the forward simulation was 0.06 ms.
randomly chosen nodes, and the ﬁfty nodes with the highest
number of contacts over the entire month. As expected, the con-
vergence is slowest and poorest for ﬁfty random nodes, better and
faster for the ﬁfty nodes with the most contacts, and best for all
nodes overall. The inequality in speed of convergence reminds us
that caution should be used when interpreting simulation-derived
risk values for individual agents, as some estimates may  be far
more reliable than others, with poorly connected agents being
particularly susceptible.
We  have compared the wall-clock running times for the topo-
logical sort required by our algorithm, our main expectation
calculation, the basic forward simulation, and a simulation using
the Sellke method for networks, as outlined and implemented in
House et al. (2012) in Fig. 6. We  ﬁnd similar distributions of running
times over 3000 instances of each computation, with similar mean
computation times: our expectation calculation takes on average
under twice the time required for a Sellke construction simulation
or forward micro-simulation, but as in Fig. 4, many simulations
would be required to converge to the expected value. Note that
the network used is fairly large (approximately 2700 nodes) and
very sparse, so we  have made adaptations to the Sellke method
on networks described in House et al. (2012) to avoid both matrix
operations that include the entire adjacency matrix of the net-
work and calculation of unneeded pseudo-random numbers. On  a
smaller, denser, network, we would expect the Sellke construction
to be signiﬁcantly faster than the forward simulation.
Our directed acyclic graph construction results in a graph that is
larger when more time steps must be considered. This means that a
longer time period or smaller time steps will result in a larger graph,
and therefore slower running time: this relationship, however, is
approximately linear: the processing becomes slower in proportion
to the number of additional nodes and edges. If the time-span is
very long, with small time steps and dense edges, the expectation
calculation may  become unfeasible.
A number of algorithmic modiﬁcations can be made to mitigateis sparse: for example, if a node v has no contact with other notes
between times ti and tj, then we  can replace the node copies of
(v, tk) for i ≤ k ≤ j with a single edge from (v, ti) to (v, tk) with an
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ppropriately modiﬁed probability of persistence as the weight on
hat edge. In a sparse dynamic network, this will signiﬁcantly cut
own the number of nodes in our directed acyclic expansion.
In addition to calculating expected outbreak size, or time to total
nfection, we can measure the contribution of a single node, edge,
r set of nodes or edges, to the expected outbreak size. The simplest
ay to do this is to calculate the expected outbreak size with the
ode, nodes, or edges in the graph, and then with them removed
rom the graph. The difference between these sizes could then serve
s a metric of the contribution of that node or edge set. For any
onstant k, we can then calculate the optimal node or edge set of
ize k to remove to minimise expected outbreak size in an nk (if a
ertex set) or mk (if an edge set) multiple of the running time of
xpected outbreak size algorithm. We  call the amount by which
he removal of a set of vertices or edges decreases the expected
utbreak size that set’s removal difference.
. Adaptations
While we have described the production of a time-expanded
raph from impulse contacts and a calculation for an SI or SIS con-
agion, adaptations can be made to the vertex and edge sets of the
ime-slice network we  have described so as to approximate differ-
nt types of contacts and contagions, while using the same general
dea of calculating an expected outbreak size. We  outline several of
hem here, but this list is by no means exhaustive.
.1. Non-impulse edges
The simplest approximate adaptation for edges that exist con-
inuously over a time period is to add a number of impulse edges
eparated by the minimum time step in the dynamic network, with
ransmission probabilities adjusted appropriately. Then one can
roduce the directed acyclic graph as described above. While this
pproach requires discretisation, so does any other approach that
equires computer processing. This could also be used when dif-
erent types of contacts persist for different periods of time: for
xample, consider the differing length of contacts between cattle
erds at two farms that physically share a fenceline, as compared
o the directed and instantaneous contact due to a trade, or the
haring of equipment.
While we  have described the production of a directed, acyclic
raph from temporally explicit network contacts, one could also
nclude persistent contacts: for example, fenceline adjacency con-
acts between farms. The main disadvantage of doing so is an
ncrease in the density of the DAG, and therefore a corresponding
ncrease in the size of breadth-ﬁrst search trees from an outbreak
eed set, and an increase in running time. This occurs in its most
xtreme form if we add a fenceline contact edge between every
arm and its neighbours at every time step. While this does not
hange the asymptotic time complexity of the algorithm as a func-
ion of the number of edges, it slows computation considerably if
he network would otherwise be sparse. For example: when run-
ing our example computation on cattle trades, if we include the
rue fenceline adjacency edges in our computation (which increases
he number of edges in the DAG by a factor of 229), the mean com-
utation time for an outbreak seeded at a single source increases
rom 0.08 to 270 ms:  if a calculation over a long time frame is
equired, the exact calculation may  no longer be appropriate. Mean
orward-simulation computation time is also increased by the addi-
ion of these edges, increasing from 0.05 ms  to 3900 ms,  with most
f this additional time being spent in generating random numbers.
owever, note that the computation time of a forward-simulation
s a function of the probability that edges transmit infection: a large
pidemic takes far longer to simulate than one that dies out quickly.ics 16 (2016) 56–62 61
This is less true for the exact calculation method: if there is even a
very small expectation of infection at a node, we will continue to
compute for that node’s children.
6.2. Adapted for undirected edges
Undirected edges between vertices can be modelled as two
directed edges; because these edges will go forward in time, they
will not cause a cycle in the time-expanded graph.
6.3. Latent infection period
Many infections e.g. Reynolds (2006) have a latent infection
period: a period of time after an agent is infected when it is not
yet infectious. This can be approximated by changing the forward
contact arrows in the time-expanded graph so that, if ıt is the latent
infectious period, then contact edges between different agents are
added between (u, t) and (v, t + ıt), rather than between (u, t) and
(v, t + 1).
6.4. Distributions of outbreak sizes
In the form described above, our expectation calculation gives
only a single expected outbreak size for a given initial seed of
expectations. However, the combination of the DAG produced, the
seed of expectations, and the probabilities of transmission and
recoveries stored on the edges of the graph contains all the infor-
mation required to reconstruct the distribution of outbreak sizes
that would be given by a stochastic forward simulation (though to
do so fully would require computation equivalent to full forward
simulation). Intermediate levels of detail about the distribution of
expected outbreak sizes is possible by tuning the set of initial seeds
for the epidemic. For example: perhaps an initially infected node
has a neighbour that is of high importance, and whether the out-
break is large or small depends largely on whether that important
neighbour is infected. We  could run our expectation calculation
with that important neighbour speciﬁed as an initially infected
seed, and then again with our that neighbour. Thus with additional
speciﬁed seedings, we  can reconstruct more and more of the distri-
bution of outbreak sizes; however, if this is to be done efﬁciently,
we would need a pre-existing correct idea of which vertices are
likely to be important. If full detail of outbreak size distribution and
variance is required, a different approach may  be more appropriate.
7. Concluding remarks
We have presented our use of a traversal-based algorithm to
calculate expected outbreak size on a temporally-changing net-
work, shown several examples of its use for rapid outbreak size
estimation, and described its use for identifying epidemiologically
important nodes in a network. We  have demonstrated that the
algorithm is practical, and has distinct advantages over simulation.
While we have investigated only the simplest contagion exam-
ples here to demonstrate the applicability of the approach, in
principle it can be extended to considerably more intricate sce-
narios, so long as they do not violate the fundamental assumptions
of the approach (for example, the algorithm must operate on a con-
tact DAG, invariant to any disease outbreak on it, with known edge
transmission probabilities). We  suggest several areas for future
investigation:1. We have suggested several adaptations of our method to include
non-impulse edges, a latent infection period, etc. Can this
approach be adapted to include removal or immunity of a node
after recovery?
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. We  (and Kim and Anderson, 2012) suggested the use of our
approach for calculating epidemiologically-important sets of
vertices: on which networks will this approach improve on
simply removing the vertices with highest degree? Can we  char-
acterise networks on which this will be the case in terms of
simple network parameters?
We  have made a python implementation of our algorithm avail-
ble on GitHub, and hope that it will become a useful tool to
esearchers who might otherwise calculate outbreak size by simu-
ation.
The implementation of such fast algorithms can be particularly
mportant where time-bound outcomes are important – for exam-
le, the application involving cattle trading links in Scotland was
eveloped in the context of policy-driven questions with short,
xternally driven deadlines, where a fully customizable simulation
ay  not have been feasible or appropriate.
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